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Abstract 
Multi-stage attacks can evolve dramatically causing much 
loss and damage to organisations.  These attacks are 
frequently instigated by exploiting actions, which in isolation 
are legal and are therefore particularly challenging to 
detect. Much research has been conducted in the multi-stage 
detection area, in order to build a framework based on an 
events correlation approach. This paper proposes a 
framework that predicts multi-stage attacks based on a 
hybrid approach, which combines two techniques; IP 
information evaluation and process query system (PQS). 
This paper shows the analysis of three multi stage attacks, 
detailing their steps and information hitherto unexploited in 
current intrusion detection systems. The paper also goes 
through the implementation of each technique used in the 
hybrid approach. 
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1. Introduction 
Multi-stage attacks have a significant impact on 
organisations. They have been described as the most 
challenging set of attacks to investigate and detect [1]. 
These attacks occur through multiple phases to get 
access to an organisation. Most of these attacks involve 
three phases. In the first phase, attackers try to analyse 
available information about the target, to find 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses that can be exploited. In 
the second phase, attackers exploit the weaknesses 
found in the first phase to inject malware into, or to gain 
access to, the system. In addition, they try to get more 
details and conduct a deep analysis about the system to 
find data or resources in which they have an interest. In 
the final phase, after gaining access, attackers are in a 
position to destroy the system or steal valuable 
information [2]. Different solutions have been 
introduced to detect multi-stage attacks, some of those 
being event correlation-based. Event correlation-based 
solutions try to match network events with certain 
attack patterns. When a stream of network events 
matches a certain pattern, attacks can be stopped before 
progressing to the next stages. Many researchers claim 
the effectiveness of that approach in detecting multi-
stage attacks. However, this approach requires having 
prior knowledge of the multi-stage attack pattern 
(sequences), which is not always feasible since 
discovering new complex attacks normally takes some 
time. The Shady Rat Operation attack is a good example 
of that; it started in 2006 and was only discovered in 
2011[3]. Thus, it has been decided to follow a different 
approach in this research, rather than depending only on 
network events correlation when proposing a solution 
for predicting multi-stage attacks. The proposed 
approach is a hybrid one based on two techniques: 
identity checker and event correlation. The identity 
checker is based on evaluating the reputation of IP 
addresses participating in network traffic using fuzzy 
logic. Fuzzy logic works on the basis of defining rules 
to produce an output. Based on specified rules, fuzzy 
logic decides whether we need to stop the traffic with 
evaluated IP addresses to block potential attacks. On the 
other hand, the event correlation component is based on 
using PQS. 
Section 2 provides a brief background of fuzzy logic, 
social engineering, CRLF (carriage return line feed) 
injection, cross-sites scripting, and PQS. Section 3 
provides an analysis of three different multi-stage attack 
scenarios that help in understanding the behaviour of 
multi-stage attacks. The first scenario is about 
communication with a bad DNS server and how that has 
been employed by an attacker to register machines to its 
bot army. The second scenario discusses the Shady Rat 
attack, which is a good example of how social 
engineering can be employed to target an organisation. 
The third scenario shows how header splitting can be 
employed by an attacker to target a network connected 
to a web host running a web application. Section 4 gives 
an overview of the proposed approach. Section 5 details 
the implementation of the identity checker. Section 6 
discusses the evaluation process detailing the evaluation 
approach and results obtained in different evaluation 
phases. Section 7 discusses how PQS could be used to 
detect attacks. Section 8 goes through some related 
work. Section 9 provides the conclusion and future 
work based on this paper. 
 
2. Brief Background 
2.1 Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic is a computational approach based on 
human language rules. The fuzzy systems translate the 
defined rules to mathematical equivalents [4]. Those 
systems, as shown in Figure 1, consist of a fuzzifier, 
inference engine, rules base, and defuzzifier. Fuzzy 
systems work as follows [4]: 
The fuzzifier converts crisp inputs to a fuzzy set by 
using specified membership functions for each input. 
 Based on the defined rules, the inference engine 
produces a fuzzy output. 
The fuzzy output is converted to a crisp value using 
the membership functions defined for defuzzifier.   
Fuzzy logic is suitable for ambiguous scenarios [5], 
where there is no certainty about making decisions. 
When comparing fuzzy logic with machine learning 
algorithms, it has been found that constructing the fuzzy 
rules for a system does not take much effort and time, 
compared to machine learning algorithms. Machine 
learning algorithms require large data sets for training to 
obtain accurate results. In addition, the training time 
with a large data set is a very time consuming process 
[6]. However, fuzzy logic may not be suitable in 
scenarios where it is difficult to deduce the reasoning 
logic.   
 
Figure 1. Fuzzy logic Components 
It will be shown in section 5 that the logic of 
detecting multi-stage attacks can be simply modelled 
using ‘if then’ rules. Based on the nature of the problem 
and mentioned advantages of fuzzy logic, it will be a 
suitable choice for building the reasoning module in the 
proposed solution.  
 
2.2 Social Engineering  
 Social engineering can play a role in constructing a 
multi-stage attack. It is the art of abusing human 
behaviour in order to violate security without victims 
realising that they have been manipulated [7]. 
 
2.3 CRLF Injection 
The CRLF injection, which is also known as HTTP 
Response splitting, is an attack that can be easily 
constructed. However, it is an extremely destructive 
web attack.  Attackers construct this kind of attack by 
exploiting vulnerable web applications that may also 
allow other types of vulnerabilities, such as cross site 
scripting and cross site forgery. The CRLF injection is 
carried out by injecting a very significant sequence of 
characters into web requests. This sequence contains 
two special characters representing EOL (end of line), 
which is used as a marker for many protocols, including 
HTTP and NNTP.  In web applications, headers are 
split based on the position of CRLF in requests. 
Malicious users inject their own CRLF sequence into an 
HTTP request. In the absence of filtering malicious 
inputs, malicious users will be able to control the 
functionalities of a web application function. In the next 
section, an example of CRLF injections will be 
discussed, showing how CRLF injections can be 
employed by attackers to construct multi-stage attacks 
[8]. 
 
2.4 Process Query System (PQS) 
PQS was defined in [9] as follows: “a new kind of 
information retrieval technology in which user queries 
are expressed as process descriptions. The goal of a 
PQS is to detect the processes using a data stream or 
database of events that are correlated with the 
processes’ states”.  In other words, it is a software 
paradigm used for addressing event-processing 
challenges [10]. The PQS modelling framework defines 
processes with unique states, dynamics, and 
observables. In the computer security context, computer 
attacks are considered the processes, while stages of 
attacks represent states. The process dynamics are 
presented by network events that move the processes 
from one state to another one (e.g. multiple consecutive 
scan, irregular DNS response).   
 
3. Multi-Stage Attack Scenarios 
3.1 Scenario A 
This scenario has been analysed by using a trace file 
that contains a capture of real network traffic [11]. The 
scenario gives an example of how attackers can register 
machines to their bot army.  In this scenario, the 
attacker used the compromised host to contact a bad 
DNS server. The DNS server returned an unusual DNS 
response containing 11 IP addresses, while a normal 
response normally does not return more than five IP 
addresses. The attacker used the compromised host to 
scan IP addresses returned in the DNS query response 
and tried to establish communication with them. After a 
successful 3-handshake with one of the IP addresses 
returned in the response, the attacker sent packets that 
contained commands used by the botnet. 
Some steps in this scenario could be considered to 
predict the occurrence of the attack. Detecting a DNS 
query with a bad DNS server can trigger an alert of 
malicious traffic. In addition, an irregular DNS response 
can indicate unusual behaviour. Moreover, sending 
packets containing commands used by botnet gives a 
strong indication that the traffic is malicious.  
 
3.2 Scenario B 
One of the multi-stage attacks, that is social 
engineering-based, is Operation Shady Rat. This attack 
was categorised by MacAfee [12] as an advanced 
persistent threat. An Operation Shady Rat attack 
involves five steps. In the first step, attackers select one 
or more organisations, then email individuals who work 
at those organisations. The emails sent contain 
information that attracts those individuals. Those emails 
also contain attached files that are relevant to the email 
body. Those files appear to recipients as normal files 
such as Word, Excel, or pdf files, but they are loaded 
with malicious code. For example, employees in a 
marketing company have a high interest in getting new 
contacts. Therefore, attackers may target this group by 
sending an email attached with an Excel file containing 
a contacts list. In the second stage, recipients download 
the attached files, then open them. At the point of 
opening the file, the malware is installed on the victim’s 
computer, thus compromising their computer. In the 
third stage, the installed malicious program tries to 
establish a connection with a remote site specified in the 
code. The remote site URL does not look suspicious and 
it looks like a link to an image or normal html file, but 
the returned contents from that URL contains some 
information used by the malicious code. That 
information cannot be seen as being suspicious content, 
as it appears as a part of the html content. In addition, 
that information may be encoded or encrypted, so it will 
be difficult to analyse. For example, html comments can 
be used to embed the information that malware uses 
inside the html content. The comments are visible to 
end users, look absolutely legitimate, and cannot be 
seen as any kind of threat.  The html comments may 
contain an IP address of a remote server or a command 
in an encrypted or encoded format. In the fourth stage, 
the installed malicious code establishes a connection 
with the IP address obtained in the third stage. In the 
fifth stage, attackers at the remote site establish a 
remote shell and run shell commands targeting the 
compromised machine. Attackers at this point can 
upload or download from the compromised side.  
All steps of this scenario look legitimate and not 
suspicious. However, checking the reputation of the IP 
addresses involved in the communication traffic 
between the malware code and other servers may give 
an indication of suspicious traffic. 
 
3.3 Scenario C 
This scenario is based on exploiting an insecure web 
application. An insecure web application can give a 
chance for attackers to get access to machines. The 
scenario shows how attackers exploit a vulnerable PHP 
web application to make a CRLF injection. The first 
step in this attack is carrying out a web vulnerability 
scan on a web server. This scan gives an attacker 
information about PHP configurations and different 
URLs, including POST and GET parameters sent with 
them. The attacker then uses that information to send an 
email to a victim containing a CRLF-manipulated link. 
This link looks legitimate, but it contains parameters set 
to values that make a vulnerable web application open a 
different URL, rather than the specified URL in the 
code. The injected URL may point to a file that runs on 
the victim’s machine to push a remote shell for the 
attacker.  The attacker proceeds by getting access to the 
web server, then downloads files or scans the network 
to find information they are interested in, or find targets 
they want to destroy.   
This type of attack can be predicted or stopped at 
different points. The first point is checking parameters 
sent with web requests coming to the web server, 
whether it can cause CLFR injections or not. In addition 
to that, outgoing requests from the web server can be 
checked to see whether they go to trusted destinations or 
not.   
 
4. The Proposed approach  
The proposed approach is based on using two 
techniques; IP Information evaluation and process query 
systems as shown in Fig 2. The approach includes two 
components; each one is based on one of the two 
techniques. If the output for each component states 
normal traffic; the traffic will be normal. On the other 
hand, the traffic will be classified as malicious by this 
approach if one of its components classified the traffic 
as malicious. The idea behind using the mentioned 
techniques is to check the traffic from different 
perspectives. The first technique checks the traffic in 
terms of identity while the other one checks the traffic 
in terms of contents. Therefore, the traffic will be 
considered as a legal traffic only if both identity (IP 
participated in the traffic) and traffic contents are not 
malicious.  
 
 
Figure 2. The proposed solution block diagram 
 
5. The Identity checker  
5.1 An overview 
The identity checker is based on evaluating the 
reputation of IP addresses participating in the captured 
network traffic. The identity checker consists mainly of 
three modules as shown in Fig 3. The first module 
(Network Sniffer) is responsible for monitoring network 
traffic by reading incoming and outgoing traffic (It is 
implemented using tcpdump). This module extracts IP 
addresses found in network packets. The IP info finder 
is responsible for finding information related to the IP 
addresses. The information obtained by the second 
module includes IP geographic information and other 
information that shows whether the IP addresses to be 
checked are malicious. The last one is the reasoning 
module which is fuzzy logic-based. This module 
receives IP information from the previous module then 
analyses the information based on predefined rules to 
decide whether the checked IP is a potential source of 
malicious traffic or not. 
 
Figure 3. The identity checker block diagram 
5.2 Network Sniffing Module 
Network traffic is monitored using TcpDump tool. 
It has been decided to choose this tool as it is has 
distributions over many operating systems. In addition, 
it is a command line which simplifies the integration 
process with other modules. Moreover, it can be used 
with a software such as wire shark to obtain a graphical 
representation. TCP dump reads network packets then 
parsed to extracts IP addresses, it then push messages in 
a queue that will be consumed by the next module (IP 
info finder). 
5.3 IP Information Finder Module 
This module gets information about IP participating 
in the traffic using web services (Neutrinoapi and fraud 
lab) [13, 14]. The information obtained includes IP 
geographic location, whether the IP in a block list, if the 
IP is an anonymous proxy, if the IP is an exit tor node, 
and the average IP rating which has a value between 
one and three (one is a the lowest rate and three is the 
highest). The geographic location will be checked 
against a predefined list of countries known with high 
volume of malicious traffic (the list will be referenced 
later as the malicious geographic list). 
5.4 Reasoning Module 
As mentioned earlier, the reasoning module is fuzzy 
logic based. The reasoning module receives its inputs 
from the previous module (IP info finder) and analyse 
them based on defined rules in order to decide whether 
the IP is malicious or not. The four elements of fuzzy 
logic have been implemented as follow: 
1- The Fuzzifier: The membership function selected (is 
IP in the malicious geographic list, is IP an 
anonymous proxy, is IP a tor exit node, and is IP 
block listed) is a singleton function, as those inputs 
are Boolean values. The selected membership 
function for IP rating is specified using triangle 
functions, as shown in Fig 4.  
 
 
Figure 4: The selected membership function for 
IP rating 
2-  Rule Base: This is the part that contains the logic 
of producing the output. The rule base in this 
module contains four if-then rules as shown in 
table1. 
Table 1. If-then rules used in the reasoning 
module 
If condition Then statement 
(IP in a block list) 
Possible malicious 
traffic 
(IP country in the malicious 
geographic list) AND (IP is an 
anonymous proxy) 
Possible malicious 
traffic 
(IP country in the malicious 
geographic list) AND (IP is a TOR 
exit node ) 
Possible malicious 
traffic 
(IP Rating is low) 
Possible malicious 
traffic 
 
The first rule is straightforward, the IP will be 
considered as a malicious one if the IP address is 
found in a block list. Finding an IP in a block list 
means that the IP address has been reported as 
having been used in malicious activities. The second 
and third rules check two parameters. One of them is 
whether an IP is on the malicious geographic list or 
not. It is not practical to consider an IP as a 
malicious one if it is only located in one of the 
countries found in the malicious geographic list, as 
there may be legal traffic from these countries. 
Anonymous proxies and tor are used in a way that 
enables users to protect access to the web 
anonymously. Attackers normally do not need to be 
in the listed countries, they direct their traffic 
through a proxy or tor located in one of those 
countries. Therefore, getting traffic from anonymous 
proxies or tor-exit nodes located in those countries 
raises an alert of potential malicious traffic. The last 
rule checks the average IP rating. The IP address 
will be considered malicious if the average rating is 
low.  
3- Defuzzifier: The selected membership function for 
the output is as shown in Fig 5. The output 
represents the probability of having malicious 
traffic from the checked IP address. If the 
probability is higher than 0.5, the IP will be 
considered as malicious. Otherwise, it will be 
considered as normal. 
4- Inference Engine: The inference engine can be 
considered as the heart of reasoning, as it is 
responsible for mapping given inputs to a fuzzy 
output, using the specified rules. The inference 
engine used in this module is Mamdani, which is 
commonly used in fuzzy logic systems [15]. 
 
Figure 5: The membership function for the ouput 
 
6.  Identity Checker Evaluation 
6.1  Evaluation Approach 
The identity checker was evaluated using a metrics 
based approach [16]. The approach looks at intrusion 
detection systems from different angles, and it includes 
logistics, architectural, and performance metrics. The 
logistic metric evaluates the system in terms of 
maintainability, manageability, and dependency. The 
design metric is used to find how well the system 
performs in terms of resources consumption, 
integration, and speed. The last metric used in this 
approach is the confusion metric (performance metric), 
which finds how well the system does its job (detecting 
multi-stage attacks) in the form of true positive, true 
negative, false positive, and false negative. Each 
category in the logistic and design metrics will have a 
score between one and three (one is the lowest and three 
is the highest) based on number advantages and 
disadvantages For example, consider evaluating the 
system throughput. The system will score one If it has a 
low throughput while it will score two if it has a high 
throughput but with consuming a lot of hardware 
resources. On the other hand, the system will score three 
if it has a high throughput without consuming a lot of 
hardware resources. 
 
6.2 Logistics Metrics 
Table 2 shows the score for each item in the logistic 
assessment. The score for the distributed management 
item is two, as the system supports it but with some 
potential issues in the buffering area. The score for ease 
of configuration is two as many of its components can 
be easily installed but the configurations is not 
centralized in one user interface and is scattered over 
different areas. In addition, some components require 
prior knowledge to get installed. The score for ease of 
policy management is also two, as detection rules can 
be easily changed by using the same inputs. The score 
for outsource solution is poor (one), as the system is 
found to be massively dependent on using web services. 
The score for platform requirements is three, as the 
system supports running on different platforms, and its 
hardware requirements are dependent on network 
volume traffic. 
Table 2. Logistics metrics 
Item Score 
Distributed Management 2 
Ease of configuration 2 
Ease of policy management 2 
Outsource Solutions 1 
Platform Requirements 3 
6.3 Design Metrics 
Table 3 shows the score for each item in the design 
assessment. The score for adjustable sensitivity is two, 
as it supports adjusting sensitivity through modifying 
the fuzzy rules but is associated with some difficulties 
in some scenarios. The score of data storage is three, as 
it does not require less than one Megabyte to store fuzzy 
rules and blacklisted countries in a database. The score 
for multi-sensor support is three, as it has the ability to 
communicate with different sensors, other than the one 
proposed with the system. The score for both firewall 
interaction and incident logging/notification is also 
three, as the system is an open source PHP code that can 
be easily modified. The score for packet loss is two, as 
TCPDUMP cannot perform well in high-speed 
networks. The system throughput on the testing 
environment has not achieved a high rate abut it is 
acceptable (around 10 packets/second), so the score will 
be two for this item. 
 
Table 3. Design Metrics 
Item Score 
Adjustable sensitivity 2 
Data Storage 3 
Multi sensor support 3 
Firewall Interaction 3 
Incident Logging and notification 3 
Packet loss 2 
System Throughput 2 
6.4 Performance Metrics 
The performance was first tested using a list of 
91,744 IP addresses (10.99% Normal, 0.57% 
anonymous proxy in a black listed country, 88.53% 
block listed IP addresses) to ensure that the solution was 
capable of distinguishing between malicious and normal 
IP addresses. The results obtained were as shown in 
table 4. 
 
 Table 4. Confusion Metrics 
Class True Positive False Negative 
Normal 1.00 0.00 
Malicious 0.9984 0.0016 
 
The solution was then tested with four different 
multi-stage attack scenarios (SQL attack, Cross site 
scripting, Dictionary attack, and UDP scan) [11] using 
their trace files. The solution was able to predict three of 
them (SQL attack, Dictionary attack, and UDP scan) 
from the first packet, while it failed to detect the cross 
site-scripting scenario as none of the IP addresses 
participating in the traffic was categorised as malicious. 
 
7. PQS Based Model 
7.1 Overview 
As discussed in the previous section, the identity 
checker fails to predict attacks if IPs involved in the 
traffic are not categorized as malicious. In this case, the 
traffic contents need to be analysed in order to capture 
any malicious activity. The following was reported [17] 
about conventional network security tools:    
“Conventional network security applications fail to 
provide the security analyst with a central repository 
and correlated view of attack data as observed by 
different systems, processes, etc. In situations where 
the analyst oversees an enterprise-sized network, 
critical information can be easily overlooked due to 
massive overload of data from deployed security 
applications”.   
Process Query Systems (PQS) is highy capable in 
terms of fusion and correlation of malicious network 
activities in addition, it can track multiple attacks 
simultaneously. Therefore, it can be employed to detect 
the sequence of security state transitions occurring 
during multi-stage attacks [10]. One of the systems 
based on PQS is PQSNet that uses sensors established 
around network such as IDS, web logs, and firewalls. 
The data provided by sensors are parsed into 
observation then provided to PQS that updates the 
states of processes. 
 
7.2 Sensors 
As mentioned in the previous section, PQS are fed 
by sensors. In this module, a number of sensors will be 
used based on attacks that will be modelled. Therefore, 
the following sensors will be used: 
 
• Network sniffer: It can be used as a sniffing module 
that tells about network traffic activities. For example, 
it can provide the protocol and port used in 
communication. It can be also used to check the 
contents of received packets in some cases. TCPDUMP 
or SNORT can be used as a network sniffer 
 
• Web log: Web server logs from APACHE can tell 
whether there are some web requests containing some 
suspicious values. It can also provide all errors returned 
by the webservers 
 
• DB log: it can provide information about number of 
some queries on a specific table (e.g. user credential 
table) within a specific period of time. 
 
7.3 Processes 
In this context, attacks are considered processes. 
Four attack scenarios will be considered in this paper 
for modelling as examples of using a PQS approach in 
detecting multi-stage attack scenarios.  Any other 
attack model can be then added to PQS without the 
need   to change other models. That gives an advantage 
of PQS over a rules-based approach that requires 
updating many rules when considering new attacks. 
 
The first scenario is the scenario that was discussed 
earlier in this paper.  This scenario passes through 
multiple states. The first one is triggered by sending a 
DNS query. The second one is triggered by receiving 
an irregular DNS response. The third state is attempting 
to communicate (TCP handshake) with one of the IPs 
in the irregular DNS response (it may be more than one 
attempt). Once the communication is established, bot 
net commands are sent. The PQS model of this attack 
scenario consists of three states  (A, B, C) and three 
observables which are DNS query (a), irregular DNS 
response (b), and TCP handshake with one of the IPs 
returned in the DNS response (c) as shown in Figure 6 
(Model 1). An alert will be raised if state C is reached. 
 
The second scenario that will be considered for 
PQS modelling is scenario C (Carriage Return Line 
Feed injection) that was discussed earlier in this paper. 
The first state is associated with a scan for PHP 
configurations. The second state is triggered by 
receiving a request containing special characters 
(CRLF) that can be used for splitting headers. The last 
state is triggered by requesting a file from an external 
server. The last state and event will be excluded from 
the modelling as the system should not reach that state, 
which indicates the occurrence of the attack. Therefore, 
modelling this scenario will involve only two states (D, 
E) and two observables which are a PHP configuration 
scan (d) and receiving a suspicious web request 
containing CRLF characters (e) as shown in Figure 6 
(Model 2). An alert should be raised once a suspicious 
web request is received even if it is not preceded by a 
scan.  
 
The third scenario that will be considered in PQS 
modelling is the scenario that the identity checker 
model failed to detect (the cross site scripting scenario). 
This scenario is very similar to the previous one. It can 
be detected once a web request is received that contains 
some tags (HTML or JavaScript tags). This step may 
be preceded by a web request that calls the page 
experiencing a cross-site scripting vulnerability. 
Therefore, this scenario can be modelled involving two 
states (F, G) and two observables; normal web request 
(f) and suspicious web request containing HTML or 
JavaScript tags (g) as shown in Figure 6 (Model 3).  
Similar to the previous model, an alert should be raised 
once a suspicious web request is received even if it is 
not preceded by a normal web request.  
 
The last scenario is an SQL attack. In this scenario 
an attacker tries to send a huge volume of web requests 
from different machines in a very short period of time. 
These web requests target web pages that contact a 
database. That creates a huge load on the database 
server causing it to go down. Modelling this scenario 
will include two states while the observables will be 
defined as an SQL query requested from the web 
server. The transition from the first state to the second 
state, which indicates the occurrence of an SQL attack, 
will be triggered by a number (will refer to it as n) of 
an SQL query requested from the web server occurring 
within a very short period of time as shown in Figure 6 
(Model 4).  
 
Table 5 shows all observables involved in the 
processes and their sources. In other words, the table 
shows from which sensor each observable is 
monitored. 
 
  
 
Figure 6: The membership function for the 
output 
 
Table 5. List of observables 
Observable Description Source 
a A DNS query Traffic sniffer 
b Irregular DNS query response  Traffic sniffer 
c TCP handshake attempt Traffic sniffer 
d Configuration scan Web logs 
e 
A suspicious web request 
containing CRLF 
Web logs 
f Normal web request 
Web 
log/Traffic 
sniffer 
g 
A suspicious web request 
containing HTML/JavaScript tags 
Web logs 
h,i SQL query from a web server DB logs 
8. Related Work 
A number of research studies have been conducted 
in the multi-stage attacks detection area. One of the 
studies [18] proposes a correlation framework that 
combines two engines, online and offline, and uses two 
mechanisms, high quality knowledge-based and 
statistical-based correlation. The proposed framework 
achieved a 92% multi-stage detection rate and 21.8% 
false positive rate during their lab experiments.  This 
approach reduces the computation expenses by 
analysing only alerts received by IDS. However, the 
massive dependence on alerts received by IDS may lead 
to missing capturing attacks if alerts are not received.  
Another study [19] proposed a system that follows 
the attack scenario construction approach. This 
approach is based on associating two security incidents, 
and it tries to find consequences of one incident and 
prerequisites for the incident that may occur later. The 
strong point of this approach is the ability to construct 
new attacks created by a mixture of known attacks that 
can be detected. On the other hand, attacks cannot be 
tracked without finding cause and effect of these 
attacks. Moreover, it requires a large consumption of 
computer resources. 
Another study was based on using Hidden Markov 
Models (HMM) [20].  This study found that the HMM 
approach achieved greater classification accuracy, 
compared to other approaches. However, they reported 
that the accuracy obtained was at the expense of 
additional computations. 
The proposed solution has an advantage over the 
above-mentioned solutions by checking the identity and 
the traffic contents rather than the traffic contents only. 
However, it may require more hardware resources as it 
has got two components. In addition, the complexity of 
the system is highly dependent in optimizing the 
number of models added to the system. 
 
9. Conclusion and Future Work 
The proposed approach in this paper to detecting 
multi-stage attacks is based on a hybrid approach that 
involves evaluating IP addresses participating in 
monitored network traffic using fuzzy logic. In addition, 
it involves using the PQS approach, which checks the 
traffic contents. The identity checker (IP info-based 
component) has been evaluated individually using a 
metrics-based approach. It has a medium score from the 
logistics perspective. On the other hand, it has a high 
score when looking from the design perspective. The 
last part of the evaluation looks at the system 
performance, and it was found that the system achieved 
a good performance with zero false positive and a high 
detection rate. However, it fails to detect multi-stage 
attacks if IP addresses participating in the traffic are not 
classified as malicious IP addresses. Such cases will be 
handled using the PQS approach. 
It is planned to add more models to the PQS-based 
components then evaluating individually using the 
metrics-based approach. When adding more models, 
optimizing the number of models by combining similar 
models within one model will be considered in order to 
improve the performance of the system overall. 
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